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The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. .

.

. He may prosecute with

earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to 6use every legitimate means to bring about a just
23

one.

The preceding passage from Justice Sutherland's 1935 opinion in
Berger v. United States should strike as deep a chord today as it did over
sixty years ago. All too often, however, this "duty to refrain from
improper methods," 237 seems to have taken a back seat for many
prosecutors, especially when rules of ethical conduct are concerned. In
particular, the duty to refrain from contacting parties who are represented
by counsel (the "anti-contact" rule) is one which government attorneys
apparently are not only willing to disregard but, before passage of the
McDade Amendment, were indeed able to disregard at will.
In Part I, this article will examine the anti-contact rule, its history,
goals, and the path it has taken in the context of prosecutorial contact with
represented parties. Part II will discuss the McDade Amendment, its
genesis and purpose. Part III will discuss the struggle undertaken by the
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Department of Justice [hereinafter "DOJ"] as it seeks to exempt its
lawyers from the anti-contact rule. Finally, Part IV looks at arguments for
and against prosecutorial exemption from the anti-contact rule.
I. THE CURRENT ANTI-CONTACT RULE: ABA MODEL RULE 4.2
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 4.2 "is currently the paradigmatic anti-contact rule upon which state
and federal district courts base their own anti-contact rules." 2 38 As such,
Model Rule 4.2 has been adopted and applied in one form or another in all
fifty states. 239 As amended in 1995, Model Rule 4.2 states, "[i]n
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do
so. ,240 The 1995 amendment to the rule altered the language somewhat,
protecting not only parties, but all represented persons. In short, the anticontact rule "exists to protect 'the represented person against overreaching
by adverse counsel, safeguard the client-lawyer relationship from
interference by adverse counsel, and reduce the likelihood that clients will
disclose privileged or other information that might harm their
interests'. '' 24 1 Additional policies underlying the rule include: "protecting
the lawyer's ability to monitor her client's case" and, "fundamentally,
promoting a legal 2 system premised on representation by and advice of
24
learned counsel. ,
The most significant aspect of Model Rule 4.2 is its facial
acknowledgment that lawyers and non-lawyers are unequals in matters of
law. 243 Underscoring the potential inequality between lawyers and nonlawyers in legal discussions, "the rule is not satisfied with lawyers seeking
permission from non-lawyers to talk about the subject of representation in
the absence of the other lawyer, but instead demands permission come
from an equal. '2 44 Even the DOJ recognizes that "when two parties in a
legal proceeding are represented, it is generally unfair for an attorney to
238
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circumvent opposing counsel and employ superior skills and legal training
to take advantage of the opposing party." 45 Apparently, however, the
potential for unfairness does not exist when the circumvention is
undertaken by those attorneys employed by the Department itself. Indeed,
"it is surprising that the United States Department of Justice, a federal
entity which by its very name exists to preserve justice, has exempted its
attorneys from having to observe the anti-contact
rule promulgated by the
2 46
legal profession and imposed upon all lawyers."
As discussed above, the background of Model Rule 4.2 seems simple
enough. However, beginning in the late 1980's, the anti-contact rule
embarked on a winding path which forms the basis for this article.
Beginning with the basic directive of Rule 4.2, its journey leads us
through a 1988 decision in the Second Circuit, 247 to a now infamous
memo written in 1989 by then-Attorney General Richard Thornburgh,
further still through a critical Ninth Circuit decision, 24 8 a Federal
2 50
Regulation, 249 another court decision-this time in the Eighth Circuit,
and, finally, to a "little-noticed provision tacked on to a $520 million
omnibus1 spending bill, innocuously titled 'The Citizen's Protection
Act.",

25

II. THE MCDADE AMENDMENT
"Some folks don't like being prosecuted, so they've got to strike back
at federal prosecutors."' 2 52 Apparently, federal prosecutors picked on one
of the wrong folks when they decided to go after Rep. Joseph M. McDade,
a Republican from Pennsylvania. After being indicted by a federal grand
jury in 1992, McDade endured an eight year investigation that eventually
led to his acquittal of conspiracy and racketeering charges. 2 53 McDade
was charged with accepting over $100,000 in gifts and other items from
defense contractors and lobbyists. 2 54 Before leaving the House of
245
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Representatives after serving eighteen terms in office, Rep. McDade

stated that "the liberty of every citizen of this country" 255 depended on the
passage of his Citizens Protection Act because federal prosecutors were
allowed to engage
in "questionable conduct without penalty and without
6

oversight.

25

The McDade Amendment easily made it off Capital Hill and to the
President's desk with overwhelming bi-partisan support. 257 In addition to
the American Bar Association, other supporters of the measure included
the Conference of Chief Justices, The American Corporation Counsel
Association and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 258 The McDade
Amendment, in relevant part, states:
(a) An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State
laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing
attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that
attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner
as other attorneys in that State. (b) The Attorney General
shall make and amend rules of the Department
of Justice to
259
assure compliance with this section.
The new law took effect on April 19, 1999, after a 180-day waiting
period supposedly imposed so that Attorney General Janet Reno could
260
amend Justice Department rules to reflect the statutory provision.
According to one commentator, however, the Amendment, as approved,
was "watered down," and the 180-day holding period was provided simply
to "give the Justice Department time to get it [the McDade Amendment]
26
repealed. , 1
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At first reading, the McDade Amendment appears fundamentally fair.
After all, why should federal prosecutors be held to a different ethical
standard than attorneys on the other side of the aisle? However, the notion
of applying "[s]tate laws and rules, and local Federal court rules" to
federal prosecutors "to the same extent and in the same manner as other
attorneys in that State" has given rise to an ongoing battle of seemingly
biblical proportions. Commenting that the group feels a bit like David vs.
Goliath, past chairman of the ABA's ethics committee Lawrence J. Fox,
stated, "it has always been our position that the regulation of lawyers is
done on a state-by-state basis. Even if you work
for the Department of
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III. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STRUFFLES WITH THE ANTICONTACT RULE
Before the 1970's, prosecutors virtually had de facto immunity with
regard to ethical violations. 26 3 Reported bar charges against prosecutors
were rare. 264 However, by the 1970's creative criminal defense lawyers
began to develop arguments for suppressing evidence and sanctioning
prosecuting attorneys for violating the anti-contact rule. 265 These
arguments were much more effective against State prosecutors than
Federal prosecutors. 266 Federal courts seldom, if ever, went after
prosecutors for violating the anti-contact rule, and then only when the
2 67
improper contact occurred in connection with another ethical violation.
The status quo changed dramatically in 1988 with a decision out of the
Second Circuit, United States v. Hammad.26 8
A. United States v. Hammad
Despite the apparent carte blanche of the federal prosecutor during the
1970's and through the mid-1980's, one remaining "sticking" point dealt
with the anti-contact rule as applied before or after the indictment of an
individual. In the majority of jurisdictions, courts consistently held that
the anti-contact rule did not apply before there was an indictment,
regardless of whether or not the criminal suspect had retained counsel.2 69
However, by 1988 the Second Circuit, in United States v. Hammad, held
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that the anti-contact rule "applies to federal criminal investigations both
before and after indictment, [and] that a prosecutor violates the rule by
using an informant to gather information from a suspect known to be
represented by counsel. ' 270 In Hammad, the court initially invoked the
anti-contact rule to "restrict prosecutors and their agents from
communicating with represented suspects during the course of an
investigation." 27 1 The Hammad court revised its opinion, however,
providing "that as long as legitimate investigative techniques were used,
direct communications with represented suspects would generally be
permissible."' 272 The investigative technique in Hammad included a sham
grand jury subpoena presented to the defendant, a represented party, by an
associate now acting on behalf of the government. Despite finding that the
investigative technique was indeed illegitimate, the Hammad court
declined to suppress statements obtained from the defendant. 273 Although
the Hammad decision ended somewhat favorably for the government, "the
mere prospect that evidence might be suppressed or, even worse, that
federal prosecutors might be sanctioned personally
for violating the no274
government.
the
to
chilling"
remained
contact rule
B. The Thornburgh Memorandum
It was the prospect of suppression or sanction that compelled thenAttorney General Richard Thornburgh to write his now infamous
"Thornburgh Memorandum," which unilaterally excused federal
prosecutors from the bounds of ethical conduct regarding contact with
represented parties. 275 In his memorandum, entitled "Communication
With Persons Represented By Counsel," Thornburgh stated:
It is the clear policy of the Department that in the course of
a criminal investigation, an attorney for the government is
authorized to direct and supervise the use of undercover
law enforcement agents, informants, and other cooperating
individuals to gather evidence by communicating with any
person who has not been made the subject of formal federal
criminal adversarial proceedings arising from that
investigation, regardless of whether the person is known to
be represented by counsel. It is further the policy and the
experience of the Department that what it may do in an
undercover setting, it may similarly do overtly. Routine
contacts with witnesses, even when not done undercover,
are an integral part of federal law enforcement, even where
270
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a lawyer may represent the witness. Traditionally, local bar
rules have not been thought to prohibit such contact and
any attempt to use2 the
rules in this way runs afoul of the
76
Clause.
Supremacy
"The Thornburgh Memorandum set off a firestorm within the
organized bar" as the ABA, private bar associations, and academics
immediately cried foul. 277 Subsequently, "Attorney General Thornburgh's
attack on the judiciary's inherent supervisory power over officers of the
court and the right of state bars to govern the ethical conduct of attorneys
licensed in their jurisdictions was quickly and vigorously rejected by the
courts., 27 8 The DOJ's attempt to excuse its own attorneys from an ethical
code of conduct, that had been widely accepted and complied with for
almost a hundred years, buttressed for many the idea that prosecutors
279
operate at a lower standard of ethical conduct than other attorneys.
Attorney General Thornburgh justified the DOJ exemption from the
code of ethics in two ways. First, he looked to the language of Model Rule
4.2, particularly that portion allowing contact with a represented party
where the lawyer "is authorized by law to do so." In the memorandum,
Thornburgh asserted that the "authorized by law" language in Model Rule
4.2 allows an exemption for federal prosecutors, as the DOJ's position on
contacting represented parties would be codified "in the near future," and,
as such, would have the force and effect of law. 280 Under Thornburgh's
second justification, the memorandum asserted that the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution barred the enforcement of ethics rules at state and local
levels against federal prosecutors. "In the rare instance where an actual
conflict arises [between the state ethics rules and conduct of the federal
prosecutors]," Thornburgh stated, "the Supremacy Clause forbids the
states from regulating the attorneys' conduct in a manner inconsistent with
their federal responsibilities, as determined by federal law and the
Attorney General."'2 81 Considering the broad and somewhat cavalier
assertions made in the Thornburgh Memorandum, it is not surprising that
the courts wasted no time in once again addressing the issue of
prosecutorial exemption from the anti-contact rule.
C. Judicial Outrage in the Aftermath of the Thornburgh Memorandum
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By all accounts, the Thornburgh Memorandum was "a disaster both
from a public relations and a legal perspective."2 82 Courts nationwide did
not take kindly to the notion that federal prosecutors were essentially
untouchable with respect to ethical violations. The memorandum "posed a
challenge to the constitutional authority of courts to regulate federal
prosecutors. Courts did not take this challenge lightly." 283 For instance, in
In re John Doe, a federal district court in New Mexico responded to the
Thornburgh Memorandum stating,
[t]he Government threatens the integrity of our tripartite
structure by arguing [that] its lawyers, in the course of
enforcing the laws regulating public conduct, may
disregard the laws regulating their own conduct .... [T]he

insolence with which the Government promotes this as
official policy irresponsibly
compromises the very trust
284
which empowers it to act.

The Doe court continued, addressing the contention that the DOJ itself
is vested with the authority to interpret when and how the code of ethics
applies to its attorneys:
[t]he idea of placing the discretion for a rule's interpretation
and enforcement solely in the hands of those governed by it
not only renders the rule meaningless, but the notion of
such an idea coming from the country's highest law
enforcement official displays an arrogant disregard for285
and
profession.
legal
the
in
ethics
irresponsibly undermines
The Doe court was not the first to respond to the Thornburgh
Memorandum. In United States v. Lopez, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California stated that the idea that the anti-contact
rule does not apply to federal prosecutors simply because Richard
Thornburgh's memorandum stated as much was, "to put it bluntly,
preposterous."2 86 Moreover, "in addressing the government's claim that
the government lawyer's actions were 'authorized by law,' the court held
that nothing in the statutes cited by the government 'expressly or impliedly
authorizes contact
with represented individuals beyond that permitted by
2 87
case law'.,

"The majority of courts following Lopez have held that the
memorandum, far from being a meaningful authority, was nothing more
than a policy statement issued by the head of a federal agency which could
282 Green, supra note 30, at 477.
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not constitute federal law sufficient to supplant state regulations."
Indeed, according to one commentator, "[t]he Thornburgh Memorandum
was just that - a memorandum. It did not have the force of law."2 89 Before
the Thornburgh Memorandum, when Federal prosecutors confronted the
problem of an ethical charge concerning an improper contact with a
represented person, courts tended to interpret the rule favorably to the
prosecutors and carve out wide exceptions for them.2 90 However, after the
memorandum, once the DOJ changed its strategy from abiding by the
ethical rules to ignoring them, courts tended to look less favorably at DOJ
attorney conduct, especially in cases in which the federal prosecutor cited
the Thornburgh Memorandum to justify such conduct. 29 1 It quickly
became clear that Richard Thornburgh's memorandum was not going to be
the anti-contact rule answer the DOJ had initially hoped.

D. The Reno Rules
Despite heavy criticism from courts and commentators across the
county, the DOJ continued its fight for exemption from the rules of ethical
conduct. In 1994, one year after Lopez, Attorney General Janet Reno
decided to enter the fray with her own attempt at exempting prosecutors
from the Model Rules' ethical standards. Under Reno, the DOJ sought to
use 5 U.S.C. § 301, also known as the "housekeeping statute," as authority
to create a new regulation that would exempt DOJ attorneys from outside
accountability.2 9 2 The DOJ hoped that codification of the exemption
would give it the legal authority of federal law. In addition to exempting
DOJ attorneys from state and local ethical rules, §77.11 of Title 28 (the
"Reno Rules") provide the sole power to discipline any ethical violations
to the DOJ itself.293 Nevertheless, these new regulations purported to
adhere to the general principles that are the foundation of the anti-contact
294
rule.
Although the "Reno Rules" generally indicated the DOJs intent to
conform to the overall spirit of the anti-contact rule thereby prohibiting
federal prosecutors from communicating with a represented party without
his attorney's consent, the Rules also provided for wide latitude,
recognizing six situations in which prosecutors could contact a defendant
without his or her attorney's permission. 295 The Rules allowed prosecutors
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to contact represented parties in the following situations: first, to
determine whether the individual was represented;2 96 second, to "discuss
the subject matter of the representation with a defendant in the course of
conducting discovery and performing judicial or administrative processes,
provided [prosecutors] do so in accordance with the court's orders or
rules;" 297 third, without seeking prior approval from a party's attorney,
federal prosecutors can communicate with a party who initiated the
contact if the prosecutors obtain a "signed, written statement
acknowledging the party's waiver of his right to have an attorney present"
and "permission from the court which had either determined the waiver is
valid or obtained substitute counsel who consented to the
conversations;" 2 98 fourth, "if at the time of arrest the represented party
knowingly waived his Miranda rights, discussions conducted at that time
are permissible;"' 299 fifth, the Rules permit "contacts involving
'investigations of additional, different or ongoing crimes or civil
violations';" 30 0 and sixth, in "situations in which prosecutors have a good
faith belief that a person's life or safety is endangered and that
communications with a represented party are necessary to eliminate the
risk, contact with the party aimed at gaining information to provide
protection is acceptable." 30' In light of the wide prosecutorial latitude
given under the six exceptions, the "Reno Rules," did not differ
significantly from the original Thornburgh Memorandum. Essentially, the
Rules were a codification of the principles of the Thornburgh
Memorandum, and, indeed, the "Reno Rules" had a similar lack of
success.
E. United States v. McDonnell Douglas
For approximately four years, the "Reno Rules," as codified at §77.11
of Title 28, were the law of the land. However, in response to a decision
of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the status of Model Rule 4.2's
application to prosecutors was about to change again. In United States v.
McDonnell Douglas Corporation,302 government investigative agents
made ex parte contacts with present and former employees of the
defendant, a corporation having contracts with the military, without the
consent of counsel. The defendant moved for a protective order barring
296 See id. at 134 (citing DOJ Communications with Represented Persons Rule, 28 C.F.R.
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such contacts based on a Missouri Supreme Court rule similar to Model
Rule 4.2. In response, the government claimed that the "Reno Rules", 28
C.F.R. §77.10(a), specifically allowed such contact. 30 3 According to the
Eighth Circuit, in order for DOJs new regulation to have the effect of
federal law, the creation of the regulation must have been within the
agency's authority. 304 In ruling that the DOJ was not granted the authority
to issue the regulation by Congress, the McDonnell Douglas court
reasoned that the congressional intent behind §5 U.S.C. 301, the
"housekeeping statute," was to provide governmental departments with
the authority to regulate the day-to-day operations of their offices, not to
provide segments of the executive bureaucracy, such as the DOJ, with
autonomous authority to exempt their employees from state and local
federal court rules of ethics.30 5 Indeed, the McDonnell Douglas court
stated, "attempts to construe [the "housekeeping statute"] as something
more was 'misuse' which 'twisted' the statute." 30 6 And, with that, the "Reno
Rules" were essentially nullified.
F. The End of the Line for the DOJ?
After McDonnell Douglas, the passage of the McDade Amendment,
mentioned above, was the next major development in the anti-contact
rule's application. The McDade Amendment emphasized the notion that
Congress wants federal prosecutors to be held accountable for ethical
violations in the same manner as all other attorneys. With passage of the
McDade Amendment, the DOJs ten year battle to avoid external ethical
regulation ended in abject defeat. Undaunted, the DOJ is now
concentrating its efforts on modifying Model Rule 4.2 itself. Surely,
certain proposals for modification may be beneficial, as members of the
bar should have input into the construction of the rules governing the
practice of law. There is also little doubt that under certain circumstances
exceptions to the anti-contact rule may be appropriate. However,
argument can be made for either side of the dueling propositions, to
exempt or not to exempt prosecutors from the anti-contact rule. The
following constitutes an overview of points for and against anti-contact
rule exemption for federal prosecutors.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PROSECUTORIAL
EXEMPTION FROM THE ANTI-CONTACT RULE
A. The Arguments for Exemption
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1. Ample Safeguards Against Prosecutorial Misconduct Currently
Exist
In his recent testimony before the new Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice Oversight, Richard Delonis, President of the National Association
of Assistant United States Attorneys, spoke out in favor of exempting
federal prosecutors from ethical limitations such as those found in the
McDade Amendment. Delonis noted what he called current "barriers" to
prosecutorial misconduct which, he argued, preempted the need for
application of the anti-contact rules to federal prosecutors.30 7 These
prosecutorial restraints include case agent training, experience, judgment,
agency investigative policy and guidelines, internal U.S. Attorney's Office
investigative and prosecutorial guidelines and policy, and judicial
approval of search warrants. 30 8 Delonis also cited certain procedural
mechanisms as restraints against prosecutorial misconduct: grand jury
indictments, motions to dismiss, motions to suppress, motions for
judgment of acquittal, and various judicial sanctions. He argued that these
are safeguards already in place, thus eliminating the need for prosecutorial
3 9
compliance with the ethical rule against contacting represented parties. 0
2. Federalism and the Supremacy Clause
Delonis also drew attention to his concerns that "the blanket
subjugation of federal prosecutors to state 'laws and rules'. . . seriously
implicates the constitutional principles of federalism and the Supremacy
Clause." 3 10 According to Delonis, the Amendment creates an opportunity
for state bar associations, and perhaps state legislatures, to promulgate
new "State laws and rules" governing federal law enforcement. 3 11 "So
construed, the [McDade Amendment] amounts to a congressional
3 12
delegation or cession of its legislative authority to the states."
3. Potential for Chaos and a Need for Uniformity
Along with Richard Delonis, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder has
voiced his concern over the McDade Amendment. Testifying before a
Senate subcommittee on March 24, 1999, Holder stated that the McDade
Amendment is "too vague and would leave prosecutors wondering which
313
ethics rules they must follow in cases involving more than one state."
According to Deputy Attorney General Holder, "We [the DOJ] firmly
believe that federal prosecutors should comply with the highest ethical
standards, regardless of who makes and enforces the rules. But we also
307 See Richard L. Delonis, Testimony at Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight,
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believe that ethics rules should be clear, predictable and reasonably
uniform, and also that they should ' 314
not unreasonably interfere with
legitimate law enforcement techniques."
Another vocal opponent of the McDade Amendment, Senator Strom
Thurmond (R-SC), echoed Deputy Attorney General Holder's concerns.
According to Sen. Thurmond, federal prosecutors already have volumes of
ethics rules they must heed. Indeed, "the problem is not that there are not
enough rules and regulations for federal prosecutors to follow." 315 Fellow
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) agrees with Thurmond, holding the position
that the McDade Amendment will "hamstring the government's get-toughon-crime efforts and cause chaos among
prosecutors who will face ethics
316
rules that differ from state to state."
According to the Amendment's opponents, varying interpretations of
the Model Rules could pose significant problems when numerous federal
317
prosecutors, all licensed in different states, work on the same case.
Indeed, the difficulty and time wasted in trying to discover which
prosecutors are barred by their state codes from such communications and
318
which are not could be a significant impediment to law enforcement.
For example, a California court may prohibit attorney contact once that
attorney knows that the opposing party is represented by counsel, even
where no formal action has been filed.319 While in Washington D.C., a
court might allow law enforcement authorities to engage in preindictment, pre-arrest, or investigative contacts with suspects known to be
represented by counsel. 320 From Richard Delonis' testimony, he is clearly
concerned with possible prosecutor confusion and the application of state
laws as opposed to federal laws of conduct. In his testimony, Delonis
pointed to the fact that many states have laws prohibiting the obtaining of
evidence by wiretap. However, federal prosecutors have been authorized
by law to gather evidence from the use of judicially sanctioned and
supervised electronic surveillance. According to Delonis, "We can
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realistically anticipate many challenges to wiretap evidence obtained
in
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surveillance."
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For each of these arguments in favor of exempting federal prosecutors
from ethical rules of conduct there exists a persuasive response in favor of
the blanket application of the ethical guidelines. Below are the most
common points addressed by those in favor of the McDade Amendment.
B. The Arguments Against Exemption
1. Exemption will Foster Abuse by Federal Prosecutors
Government proposals for modifying Model Rule 4.2 to allow a
government exemption from the anti-contact rule "will open the door for
extensive abuse by federal prosecutors."' 322 Indeed, exempting federal
prosecutors from the ban on ex parte communications with represented
parties at the pre-indictment stage would allow prosecutors to "manipulate
the timing of an indictment solely to gather information it could not obtain
after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached. 3 23 Exemption
would allow prosecutors to interview a target just prior to indictment even
if the target
had notified the federal agent that they had retained
4
32

counsel.

Also, despite arguably valid intentions by the government in seeking
exemption,

"it seems likely that in any [number]

of ...situations,

prosecutors' questioning strategies could easily manipulate the defendant
into offering an unintentional but harmful or even inculpatory response
simply because the defendant did not have his attorney's assistance." 325 In
addition to purposeful abuse by federal prosecutors, some harmful effects
of prosecutorial exemption from the anti-contact rule may not even
manifest themselves by intentional acts of these prosecutors. "At the very
least, a defendant who is sitting alone in an interview with an adversary
may inadvertently damage his own case because he is intimidated by the
mere presence of the government attorney and his surroundings."
2. Government Lawyers Do Not Need Exemption
In its amicus brief submitted in the McDonnell Douglas case, the
Conference of Chief Justices stated that "Model Rule 4.2 does not stifle
the ability of federal prosecutors to enforce the law." 326 Indeed, Model
321 See Richard Delonis testimony, http://www.naausa.org/mcdade.htm (visited Sept. 28,

1999).

322 Leesfield, supra note 4, at 24.

323 Id. (citing Amy Baron-Evans, Comment on Proposed Changes to
ABA Rule 4.2,
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, http://www.criminaljustice.org (last
visited Sept. 28, 1999).
324 Id.

325 Buettner, supra note 3.
326 Leesfield, supra note 4, at 25 (discussing United States v. McDonnell Douglas, 132
F.3d 1252 (1998)).

Rule 4.2 "allows government lawyers to engage in 'constitutionally
permissible investigative activities. . . prior to the commencement of
criminal or civil enforcement proceedings, when there is applicable
judicial precedent that either has found the activity permissible under this
Rule or has found this Rule inapplicable'."' 327 "[V]arious non-custodial
pre-indictment communications have actually been found permissible
under Model Rule 4.2. ''328 Also, if no judicial precedent exists, "the
federal prosecutor need only show the court that the law enforcement
objectives outweigh the interests in protecting the attorney-client
relationship in order to obtain an
order granting a right to communicate ex
' 329
"
party.
represented
a
parte with
3. Fundamental Fairness
The powers of the prosecutor are at an all time high.33 ° Prosecutors not
only have the power to grant plea bargains, but, because of sentencing
guidelines, they also have the power to determine the sentence as well.3 3 '
As such, creating an entirely separate body of rules allowing prosecutors
to engage in a wider range of conduct would undermine principles of
"fundamental fairness" and equality. 332 As one commentator asks, "how
can fairness and justice prevail when a similarly situated group is
governed by totally different standards and a totally different regulatory
body? 3 33 Furthermore, "[i]n its position paper supporting the McDade
Amendment, the ABA noted... that an internal Justice Department ethics
system could not guarantee the objectivity that the current, independent
system delivers." 334 Clearly, the "notion that attorneys for the government
are to be held to a different and lower standard of ethics than are other
members of the bar is very disquieting."' 3 35 The lack of objectivity in
ethics review, coupled with prospects for prosecutorial abuse, certainly
weighs in favor of the McDade Amendment.
Finally, the effect of "prosecutorial authority to contact defendants
without first obtaining permission from their attorneys will possibly be to
'intrude upon the function of defense counsel and impede his or her ability
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'
to negotiate a settlement and properly represent the client'."3 36
This fact
alone dictates in favor of a blanket application of Model Rule 4.2. Indeed,
"[t]he obtainment of justice should never outweigh the need to be just in
obtaining it by applying only legitimate, lawful investigative
techniques
337
narrowly tailored to be fair to the suspect in the situation."

V. CONCLUSION
The McDade Amendment essentially returned the application of the
anti-contact rule to its post-Hammad, pre-Thornburgh Memorandum
status. As of today, the general ethical prohibition against contacting a
represented individual applies to every member of the bar, prosecution or
defense, state or federal. However, the future of the McDade Amendment
will indeed be short-lived if opponents such as Utah Senator Orrin Hatch
have anything to say about it. "On January 19, 1999, Hatch introduced
Senate Bill 250, which would grant the Department of Justice an
exemption from the state and local federal court rules of ethics whenever
the Department of Justice decides that the rule of ethical conduct would
conflict with its own 'policies'." 338 According to one commentator,
"Hatch's bill would not only put a congressional imprimatur on the
Department's roundly condemned self-authorizing regulations purporting
to allow it to self-exempt its own attorneys and agents from the
fundamental... Rules of Ethics," but the bill would also be a tremendous
waste of tax dollars by "creating a commission on federal prosecutorial
conduct, made up of federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the
339
Supreme Court."
In the face of such formidable opposition, the future of the McDade
Amendment is certainly tenuous. While "the importance of ensuring that
federal prosecutors abide by the same rules as everyone else is selfevident to most, it remains to be seen how this hotly charged political,
constitutional and fundamentally ethical issue will play out." 340 As
members of the legal community, our universal support for the McDade
Amendment is crucial. The alternative, a selected assortment of different
ethical standards to apply different attorneys, will not succeed in carrying
out the penultimate goal of our legal system: equal justice under law.
Truly, only uniform application of one ethical standard for all attorneys
will lead to achievement of this ideal.
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